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In little over a year, more than $2 billion has been raised to address the needs of indi-viduals and communities affected by the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.The brutal loss oflife and livelihood created for many Americans an imperative to help, leading to an
unprecedented response.
This tremendous largesse was funneled both to direct relief organizations, such as
the Red Cross and the Salvation Army, and to new and existing funding entities, such
as the United Way and New York Community Trust’s September 11th Fund and the
Twin Towers Fund. Without question, all these organizations were motivated by the
same basic desire to help that generated the donations.
One year later, what can we say about our work? Were the charitable and philan-
thropic organizations successful stewards of the resources that the American public
entrusted to them? What lessons can we can apply to future situations? 
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The philanthropic community can be proud of
many aspects of its disaster-relief efforts. Significant
resources were generated to meet the needs of
individuals and families affected by the events of
Sept. 11. Systems for distributing emergency finan-
cial assistance and providing social services were
established quickly, and serious attempts were
made to ease bureaucratic barriers to obtaining
assistance. From the start, charities acknowledged
the need to coordinate their efforts. By the begin-
ning of 2002, comprehensive efforts were under
way to coordinate ongoing emergency relief and
to address unmet needs.
Some aspects of our Sept. 11 response leave
less room for congratulation. Most seriously,
fundraising appeals after Sept. 11 were so nonspe-
cific about how funds would be used that they
created a credibility gap between donors and
charities, presenting a long-term threat to the non-
profit sector. In addition, while there was a gener-
al spirit of cooperation among philanthropic and
charitable institutions, the dizzying array of funds
and service programs complicated coordination
and led to duplication of service.
At the same time, there was insufficient use of
grassroots organizations to deliver emergency
assistance to the most marginalized and at-risk
members of the affected population, particularly
low-wage workers and immigrants. Philanthropies
struggled with how to involve Sept. 11 victims in
planning and decision making. Finally, charities and
philanthropies were ineffective in communicating
the good work they did in the wake of Sept. 11,
allowing the public’s perception of them to be
defined by critics who undermined its credibility.
What Went Right?
1. Significant Emergency Assistance Funds Were
Raised. The nonprofit sector should be most
proud of the significant resources raised in the
wake of the attack.The sudden death of 3,000
people, the immediate loss of 50,000 jobs in
New York (with economic ripples that soon
affected others) and the dislocation of many
residents of lower Manhattan created urgent
needs. Families who lost a breadwinner, either
through death or unemployment, faced finan-
cial uncertainty. How would household
expenses, both routine (rent, utilities, food) and
unanticipated (funerals), be met while families
sorted out their futures? How would affected
families who were ineligible for public assis-
tance get by? Philanthropic organizations’
recognition of these needs and their ability to
raise money quickly to meet them were impor-
tant accomplishments.
2. Significant Emergency Assistance Resources
Were Distributed. Money raised for emer-
gency assistance only matters if it is effectively
distributed to those who need it. Significant
amounts were distributed to the families of
those who died, the injured and those affected
economically. For example, as of September
2002, the Red Cross reports it has distributed
$643 million to more than 55,000 people in
Sept. 11 disaster relief. The Salvation Army
reports distributing $65 million and reaching
over 100,000 victims. The September 11th
Fund of the United Way and New York
Community Trust reports distributing $336
million. The New York Times 9/11 Neediest
Fund reports providing nearly $60 million in
direct assistance.
The major providers of financial assistance,
the Salvation Army, the Red Cross and Safe
Horizons (a conduit for United Way dollars),
streamlined their documentation requirements
and waiting periods; in some circumstances
they distributed emergency financial assistance
“on the spot.” There were, however, some
bureaucratic difficulties, apparently due to inad-
equate disaster-relief infrastructure. For exam-
ple, a wait of three to four weeks for checks
from the Red Cross was not unusual initially. A
Salvation Army computer problem created an
embarrassing delay in paying bills for Sept. 11
victims. Nonetheless, the money raised was
generally available in a timely fashion to those
in need, and that is a positive outcome.
3. Charitable Organizations Cooperated in
Providing Assistance. From the start, the major
charitable organizations involved in disaster
relief recognized the need to work coopera-
tively. In New York, the primary private relief
organizations (along with government agen-
cies) colocated their services at Pier 94 to pro-
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One Year Later: Reflections From New
York on the 9/11 Charitable Response
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vide “one-stop” benefits. The organizations
worked to ensure their assistance processes
were easy to access. However, institutional dif-
ferences among them inhibited, at least in the
first several months, the creation of more
client-friendly systems, such as a single intake
form, a common database and similar financial
assistance practices.
4. Philanthropies Acknowledged the Need for
Long-Term Assistance. Over the past year,
there has been tremendous pressure on the
organizations that received cash donations for
Sept. 11 relief to distribute that money quickly
and effectively, because many victims faced
immediate financial pressures. Resources, how-
ever, will be needed to address long-term
problems for another five years, if not longer.
Veterans of the Oklahoma City bombing relief
effort advised Sept. 11 relief workers to
reserve some resources to meet long-term
needs, such as mental health counseling and
other social services.
The United Way September 11th Fund
has earmarked approximately one-third of
the resources it raised ($170 million) for
long-term needs. The New York Times 9/11
Neediest Fund has set aside $20 million for
such purposes, and the Salvation Army has
reserved approximately 25 percent ($23
million) of donations for long-term needs.
Saving resources for long-term needs is wise
as long as the organizations remain focused
about the uses for which funds are reserved
and communicate effectively with donors
and the public.
What Went Wrong?
1. Significant Funds Were Raised … But for
What? The magnitude of the philanthropic
response to Sept. 11 made it perhaps the high-
est-profile philanthropic endeavor in American
history, dramatically increasing the number of
people to whom charities were accountable
for the use of their donations. Ongoing public-
ity about Sept. 11 relief efforts gave donors at
all giving levels significant ability to assess
whether contributions were used in accor-
dance with their wishes. Yet charities may not
have been sufficiently clear about the purposes
for which the funds would be used.
Over the past year, there has been a per-
sistent conflict between the proposed use of
funds raised and donor perceptions about the
purposes for which they donated. The most
well-known and most significant conflict con-
cerned the Red Cross’s initial reservation of
some post-Sept. 11 donations for future disas-
ters. In that case, the disconnection between
donor intent and the organization’s proposed
use of funds was dramatic—perhaps the rea-
son the case received so much attention. In
other cases, the disconnection between
donors and charities seems more subtle.
Many fundraisers indicated that money
raised would be used for “disaster relief,” an
ambiguous term at best. Differing interpreta-
tions about what constitutes “disaster relief ”
created conflict between charities and donors.
What qualified as an “economic effect” of the
Sept. 11 attack? Unemployment due to the
destruction of one’s workplace? Unem-
ployment due to recession in lower
Manhattan? Unemployment due to recession
in New York City? 
The inability to specifically define their pur-
poses, coupled with the lack of consensus
about appropriate relief activities and the
unprecedented number of donors, threatened
charities’ credibility as agents of donor intent.
Admittedly, the ability of charities to be con-
crete about “disaster relief ” may have been lim-
ited in September and October as the scope of
the disaster was unfolding and short- and long-
term needs were being defined. Nonetheless,
persistent conflict between donor intent and
charities’ use of funds is among the greatest
threats to the continued vitality of the non-
profit sector. fundraising is impossible without
donor trust in the institutions to which they
give. Perhaps some of the confusion could have
been averted by increased communication
about donors’ intent, particularly between
charities and major donors.
Brookings Institution surveys suggest that
between December 2001 and May 2002,
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Community Service
Society case worker
Natasha Baptiste meets
with a client in need 
of assistance in the 
aftermath of Sept. 11.
(Photo courtesy of  the
Community Service
Society of New York.)
Americans grew more wary of charities, with 19
percent of May respondents indicating that they
had no confidence in charities, an 11 percentage
point increase since December. While it is not
possible to attribute that change directly to crit-
icisms of the use of Sept. 11 donations, it is not
unreasonable to suggest that such negative pub-
licity contributed to this increased wariness.
2. Collaboration Was Insufficient to Meet
Community Needs. Those affected by Sept. 11
benefited significantly from the major disaster-
relief organizations’ decision to collaborate.
However, not all institutional barriers were eas-
ily overcome, making the process of accessing
relief benefits less client-friendly than it could
have been.
a. “Major” Financial Assistance Coordination.
Each of the three major New York charitable
relief organizations, the Red Cross, the
Salvation Army and Safe Horizons, created its
own system for determining eligibility and dis-
tributing funds. Although services were colo-
cated, those requesting assistance had to
make separate applications to each organiza-
tion, and documentation requirements varied.
b. Coordination of Secondary Organizations.
In addition to the three primary relief
organizations, more than 100 other charities
provided financial assistance to those affect-
ed by the Sept. 11 attacks. For most of
those organizations, the provision of finan-
cial assistance was consistent with their mis-
sion, history and community base; however,
their participation in disaster relief was gen-
erally uncoordinated.They reached those in
need through word of mouth or other
informal mechanisms. Like the “major” relief
organizations, each smaller charity had its
own eligibility, application and documenta-
tion requirements.
c. Providing Relief to Hard-to-Reach and
Marginalized Populations. In general, relief
efforts were administered through large,
established institutional providers. Donors
selected those organizations because of their
historic success in providing relief and their
capacity to manage large-scale problems.
Many of the smaller, secondary financial-
assistance providers also had sufficient infra-
structure in place to operate an effective
relief effort.
Large institutions’ lack of community
base can be a problem when dealing with
underserved and marginalized populations.
Without community roots, it can be difficult
to provide assistance to such hard-to-reach
populations as undocumented workers or
non-English speakers.
The immediacy of needs and the chari-
ties’ focus on creating response capacity dis-
tracted them from ensuring information
reached all who needed it. New York City’s
nonprofit community includes a rich variety
of grassroots organizations, many based in
communities directly affected by the terror-
ist attacks. The leaders of the disaster-relief
effort, however, did not seek help from
these community-based organizations in
assisting the hard-to-reach. Several organi-
zations (such as Asociacion Tepeyac)
emerged as leaders because of their own
perseverance and the centrality of their
mission to the relief effort, but their experi-
ence was more the exception than the rule.
Charities also faced difficulties sorting
through the family relationships of the dead
to determine who was eligible for assis-
tance. Many of those who died at the World
Trade Center provided financial support to
domestic partners—gay and straight—who
were not legally recognized as relatives. In
the end, charities demonstrated more flexi-
bility in such cases than did the government,
but it took them some time to sort out
relationships and determine who merited
financial assistance. Not all charities agreed
to support all domestic partners.
Finally, there are equity issues that should
be examined. Was financial assistance dis-
tributed equitably? One can argue that low-
income populations should have been given
a greater share of financial support because
of the complex challenges they faced in
rebuilding their lives. All victims certainly
faced terrible rebuilding efforts, but in gen-
eral, lower-income individuals had fewer
resources and less social support to fall
back on.
3. Philanthropies Sometimes Failed to Act as
Partners With Affected Communities. In
recent years, philanthropies and charities have
increasingly viewed their work as a partnership
with communities in pursuit of a common goal
(such as revitalization or economic develop-
ment). In the first several months following
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The disaster-relief effort was reactive. In many
ways, it had to be.A new social problem was cre-
ated overnight, and a response had to be crafted
immediately. Yet, by focusing on immediate chal-
lenges, charities missed a critical opportunity to
tell their story. A media-savvy, coordinated effort
by disaster-relief leaders could have delivered a
positive message about the work of their institu-
tions. Instead, critics filled that void and under-
mined the charitable sector’s credibility.
Looking Ahead
What lessons do the experiences of charities
and philanthropies in the wake of Sept. 11 suggest
for the future? Perhaps one simple (and hopefully
not simplistic) lesson is to stick to the principles
and values that make our work credible to the
general public.As far as possible, we cannot let cri-
sis excuse us from our obligations. We must
honor—and be clear about—donor intent.
Institutional interests must take a back seat to mis-
sions. Effective strategies to respond to urgent
community needs must be a first priority.We must
invest in public relations. Because we work for
community change, we will be opposed; if we do
not take the time to tell our story, even amid cri-
sis, others—not friends—will tell it for us.
David R. Jones is president and chief executive officer
of the Community Service Society of New York, and
David Campbell is its vice president of programs.The
Community Service Society is a social service organi-
zation that for more than 150 years has focused on
solutions to alleviate the conditions of poverty in New
York City. In response to the Sept. 11 attacks, it dis-
tributed almost $5 million in emergency financial
assistance to nearly 3,000 families and individuals.
Sept. 11, charities developed assistance guide-
lines based on their understanding of the needs
of families and the resources available. By late
2001, individuals and families eligible for assis-
tance began to complain that they lacked a
voice in resource-distribution decisions.
Charities were uncertain about how to
respond to these complaints.
One can argue that those affected by the
events of Sept. 11 are a community, not unlike
the geographically defined communities with
which charities have worked in partnership on
other issues. Sept. 11 philanthropies that don’t
view their relationship with their beneficiaries
as a partnership leave themselves open to
accusations of paternalism.
Responses to family requests for a voice in
distribution decisions varied. A few organiza-
tions, such as the United Services Group, have
placed family members on governing boards,
while others, such as the Windows of Hope
Family Relief Fund, have created advisory roles,
feedback groups, or other mechanisms for fam-
ily input. Others have ignored the issue. The
ability of philanthropies and charities to work
effectively with any community—whether Sept.
11 victims or residents of a low-income neigh-
borhood in Brooklyn—requires a commitment
to partnership and a voice for all partners.
4. Others Told Our Story. Over $2 billion was
raised to assist Sept. 11 victims. Philanthropies
and charities responded quickly to create
capacity and distribute resources.To date, fam-
ilies have received hundreds of millions of dol-
lars to address emergency needs. Yet, in the
past year, articles in The New York Times, Daily
News, New York Post and Newsday emphasized
the negative aspects of the relief effort: the Red
Cross donation diversion, unsavory new organ-
izations soliciting donations, bureaucratic barri-
ers to financial assistance, questions about who
should receive assistance, etc. One year later,
what stands out is the absence of stories about
the speed with which disaster-relief infrastruc-
ture was created and the amount of assistance
that was provided.
Why is this issue important? As noted,
Americans made a dramatic philanthropic
investment in the Sept. 11 relief effort.The suc-
cess of that relief effort is critical to the long-
term viability of American philanthropy. If
donors feel that their contributions were used
poorly, they will be less likely to contribute to
future important charitable activities.
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New Yorkers striving to
deal with the economic
implications of Sept. 11
attend a Windows of
Hope financial seminar.
(Photo courtesy of the
Community Service
Society of New York.)
